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LOWE V. SEC: INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940 CLASHES
WITH FIRST AMENDMENT GUARANTEES OF FREE SPEECH
AND PRESS
In the wake of mounting controversy over whether federal securities
laws can withstand first amendment scrutiny," the United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in Lowe v. SEC2 to consider whether the
first amendment prohibits an injunction3 against publication and distri-
bution of an investment advisory newsletter by an unregistered invest-
ment advisor. However, the Court bypassed this constitutional question,
and instead adopted a statutory construction of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 (the "Act") 4 that excluded Lowe's newsletters as "bonafide
financial publications" of general circulation under section 80(b)-
2(a)(11)(D).5 The majority ruled that the petitioners were not investment
advisers, and therefore did not need to be registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).' Consequently, there was no justifica-
tion for restraining future publication of Lowe's newsletters.7
1. In pertinent part, the first amendment states: "Congress shall make no law... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press ... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The Court's initial
judicial standard for addressing first amendment challenges was the "clear and present dan-
ger" doctrine developed during World War I. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919) (conviction under Espionage Act of 1917 for encouraging defiance in young people
through distribution of leaflets criticizing the draft upheld). For a more thorough discussion
of the "clear and present danger" doctrine, see Mendelson, Clear and Present Dan-
ger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 313 (1952). The guarantee of free speech
became one of the nation's most protected rights in ensuing years. See, e.g., Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 381-82 (1973); Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
See generally J. BARRON & C. Di.NEs, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PREsS (1979)
[hereinafter BARRON & DiENEs]; J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
857-1027 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter NowAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG].
2. 556 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 469
U.S. 815 (1984). For an excellent discussion of the Second Circuit's decision, see Comment,
SEC v. Lowe: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Publication of Investment Newsletters
Under the Investment Advisers Act, 69 MINN. L. REv. 937 (1985).
3. See generally Steinberg, SEC and Other Permanent Injunctions-Standards for
Their Imposition, Modification, and Dissolution, 13 SEC. L. REv. 263 (1981). A single securi-
ties law violation is insufficient to obtain an injunction. Most federal courts issue an injunc-
tion only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the wrongdoer will commit the violative act
again if not enjoined. Id. at 268-69 (citing SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d
90, 99 (2d Cir. 1978)).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80(b)-I to -22 (1982) (original version at ch. 686, § 220, 54 Stat. 789
(1940)). For a discussion of the Act, see infra notes 15-41 and accompanying text.
5. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985).
6. Id. For a discussion of registration requirements under the Investment Advisers Act,
see infra note 21.
7. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 211. For a discussion of the majority's opinion, see infra text accom-
panying notes 70-75.
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Justice White, in his concurring opinion, disagreed with the majority's
construction of the Act. He found that Lowe was "an investment adviser
subject to regulation and sanction under the Act."8 However, unlike the
majority, Justice White addressed whether the SEC's attempt to bar
Lowe from publishing an investment newsletter violates the first amend-
ment guarantees of free speech and press. In his judgment, any action
preventing unregistered persons from offering impersonal investment ad-
vices through publications would violate the first amendment."
Lowe v. SEC" demonstrates the tension between the federal govern-
ment's power via the SEC to license and regulate a profession, and the
rights of free speech and press protected by the first amendment. 2 Al-
though a majority of the Court avoided the constitutional question, three
concurring Justices sent the SEC "a clear warning ... that it cannot use
the securities laws to restrict publication of financial news."" The concur-
ring opinion likely will impact on federal cases in which the SEC has pur-
sued or secured injunctions against publishers of financial newsletters.14
This comment will scrutinize the Act's purposes and scope and will dis-
cuss the first amendment law pertinent to the regulation of professions,
prior restraints and commercial speech. Next it will extensively examine
the Supreme Court's decision. This comment also will analyze the Act's
general applicability to investment newsletters, and will discuss whether
the first amendment effectively prohibits the SEC from barring publica-
tion of "Lowe-type" investment newsletters. Finally, it will conclude that
8. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 211. (White, Rehnquist, J.J., and Burger, C.J., concurring). For a
discussion of the concurring opinion, see infra text accompanying notes 76-94.
9. For a more extensive definition of investment advice, see 1 T. FRANKEL, THE REGULA-
TION OF MONEY MANAGERS, 156-62 (1978); Note, The Regulation of Investment Advisers, 14
STAN. L. REv. 827 (1962); see also Comment, Current Problems in Securities Regulation, 62
MIcH. L. REv. 680, 716 (1964) (general discussion on parties qualified to give investment
advice).
10. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 211; see infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
11. Lowe, 472 U.S. 181.
12. The tension between federal securities law and the first amendment has been summa-
rized as follows:
The securities laws protect the integrity of securities markets by requiring full disclo-
sure of information about securities issues and by prohibiting the dissemination of
false or misleading information about securities. They regulate the flow of informa-
tion in the marketplace. The first amendment, on the other hand, prohibits the gov-
ernment from unreasonably interfering with people's ability to communicate ...
through speech. It limits the power of the government to regulate the flow of informa-
tion among individuals.
Miller, The SEC as Censor: Is Banning an Investment Newsletter a Prior Restraint of the
Press? 11 Preview of U.S. Supreme Court 243 (1985).
13. 17 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1029, 1030 (June 14, 1985) (quoting a comment by the
Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press).
14. Id.
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financial newsletters, such as Lowe's, are outside the commercial speech
boundaries and therefore entitled to full first amendment protection
against prior restraint.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940
1. Introduction
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 regulates investment advisers. 15 It
was the last in a series of federal acts designed to eliminate the securities
market abuses that precipitated the 1929 stock market crash and the de-
pression of the 1930's.16 "[T]he general objective of the [Act] ... is to
protect the public and investors against malpractices by persons paid for
advising others about securities. '17 The Act originally served as a census
of United States investment advisers.18 However, amendments to the Act
in 1960, 1970, and 1975 substantially strengthened its regulatory and en-
forcement powers."
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80(b)-I to -22 (1982). For discussions of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, see 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1392-1417 (2d ed. 1961); 1 T. FRANKEL, supra
note 9, at 149-83; T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 18.1-.3 (law. ed 1985);
Harroch, The Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to Financial and In-
vestment Related Publications, 5 J. CORP. L. 55 (1979); Loomis, The Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 214,
244-49 (1959); Lovitch, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940-Who Is an "Investment Ad-
viser?", 24 U. KAN. L. REv. 67 (1975). See generally 45 Am. JuL. 2d Investment Companies
and Advisers §§ 16-18 (1969).
16. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). Regulation of
investment advisers began with the enactment of the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935. 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1982). Section 30 of this Act directed the SEC to conduct a survey of
investment trusts and companies. The SEC's report was published in five parts. See SEC
REPORT ON THE STUDY OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, HR. Doc. No.
246, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H.R. Doc. No. 136, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); HR. Doc.
No. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939-1940); HR. Doc. No. 70, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939);
H.R. Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). The SEC also studied investment advisers
during this survey, and found that "activities of investment advisers [inherently] present
various problems which usually accompany the handling of large liquid funds of the public."
H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1939). The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was
enacted largely as a result of this study. See Lovitch, supra note 15, at 67.
Other statutes enacted to regulate the securities industry include the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78-
78kk (1982), and the Commodity Exchange Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1982).
17. Lovitch, supra note 15, at 67 (quoting S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960)
(Senate Report on 1960 amendments to Act)).
18. 2 L. Loss, supra note 15, at 734.
19. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97; Investment Com-
pany Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1432; Act of September 13,
1960, Pub. L. No. 86-750, 74 Stat. 885 (all amendments codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80(b)-I to
80(b)-22 (1982)). These amendments provided additional grounds for denial of a registration
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2. Registration Requirements
Generally, investment advisers doing business through the mails or in-
terstate commerce must register with the SEC.2 0 Registration entails an
extensive disclosure of pertinent business information.2 ' The Act specifies
the grounds for denial, revocation, or suspension of a registration.
22
3. Sanctions
The Act prohibits an unregistered investment adviser or a party whose
registration has been denied or revoked from carrying on his profession. 23
The Act forbids registered and unregistered advisers from participating in
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative practices.24 An adviser violating the
Act's provisions may be subject to criminal penalties, 25 an injunction,2s or
application, gave the SEC the power to adopt record-keeping rules and regulations defining
fraudulent practices, and allowed the SEC to examine investment advisers' records. The
amendments also made certain terms of the Act applicable to all registered or unregistered
investment advisers, and eliminated exemptions for advisers whose clients were all insur-
ance companies or investment companies. See Lovitch, supra note 15, at 68. See generally
Ahart, Suggested Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act, 6 SEc. REG. L.J. 226 (1978).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-3 (1982).
21. See id. § 80(b)-3(c). Upon filing for registration as an investment adviser on Form
ADV, the applicant must disclose: name and location of business; names and addresses of
partners, officers and directors; educational background; prior and present business affilia-
tions of partners; nature of business as an investment adviser, including the manner of giv-
ing advice and rendering reports; a balance sheet and other financial statements certified by
a C.P.A.; nature and scope of authority over clients' funds; basis of compensation; whether
any disqualification exists that would be grounds for denial, suspension, or revocation of a
registration, e.g., a criminal conviction; and a statement of whether a substantial part of the
business will consist of acting as an investment adviser. Id. Investment advisers are required
to file Form ADV-5 annually to update information in the SEC's files. They also must sub-
mit a new balance sheet each year. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (1979). See generally T. HAZEN,
supra note 15, at 631-32.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-3(e), (f). The SEC can censure, revoke, or suspend the registration of
advisers who have committed crimes or associated with criminals, including false SEC fil-
ings, perjury, and crimes involving larceny, felony, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, coun-
terfeiting, mall fraud, fraud, and fraudulent funds or securities misrepresentation. Id. §
80(b)-3(e)(2).
23. Id. § 80(b)-3(a) (1982).
24. Id. § 80(b)-6. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), the
Supreme Court suggested that the Act's antifraud provisions should be given broad effect.
Id. at 194-95. The defendant, a registered investment adviser and investment newsletter
publisher, recommended stocks for purchase and sale. On several occasions it purchased
stock for its own account, just before recommending a long-term investment to clients.
When the market price went up after the recommendation, the defendant sold its shares at
a profit, "a practice known as 'scalping.'" Id. at 181. After substantial investigation, the
SEC moved to enjoin the defendant's practices. The Court held that the defendant must
disclose its "scalping" practice to its clients. Id. at 196.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-i7 (conviction of a willful violation of the Act results in a fine up to
$10,000, or imprisonment up to five years, or both).
26. Id. § 80(b)-9(e) (a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order will be
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a limited private action by investors.2 7
4. The Definition of an "Investment Adviser"
The Act defines an investment adviser as
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications... as to the value of securi-
ties or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities,
or who, for compensation and as a part of a regular business, issues or
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities; but does not include
* . . the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or
financial publication of general and regular circulation. 8
This broad definition potentially includes anyone who gives securities ad-
vice for compensation, from the highest caliber investment counselor who
gives his clients personalized advice to the publisher of a "tipster"
sheet.29
5. The "Bona Fide Publications" Exclusion
Generally, the SEC has recognized two types of investment advisers:
those publishing advisory services and market reports"0 and those offering
granted when a person has engaged in violative act). For a general discussion on SEC in-
junctions see Steinberg, supra note 3.
27. In TransAmerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), the Court held
the Act does not authorize a private right of action by investors. However, the Court recog-
nized an investor's limited right to cancel investment adviser contracts and to obtain reim-
bursement for fees paid and expenses incurred under § 80(b)-15. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 24 n.14.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-2(a)(11) (1982). This section also excludes banks, lawyers, account-
ants, engineers, or teachers whose adviser services are solely incidental to the practice of
their profession; brokers and dealers whose services are solely incidental to the conduct of
their business and who receive no special compensation; and any person whose advice re-
lates wholly to securities issued by the United States. Id. § 80(b)-2(a)(11)(A) to -2(a)(11)(F).
For a discussion of the judicial and SEC definitions of an investment adviser, and the bona
fide publications exclusion, see infra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
29. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 219 (1985) (quoting David Schenker, Chief Counsel to
SEC Investment Trust Study and one of the primary drafters of the proposed legislation);
see also Investment Trust and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Sub-
comm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sees. 47 (1940).
30. See, e.g., George A. Burnett, SEC No-Action Letter (July 11, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file) (stock market trends adviser is an investment adviser); Orient Enter-
prises, Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 2, 1976) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (Japa-
nese company which published newsletter on Japanese market is an investment adviser).
Publishers who distribute mainly historical or statistical compilations have been consid-
ered investment advisers. See, e.g., James H. Ogburn, SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 18, 1977)
(LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (monthly computerized analysis of financial data or
stock is an investment advisory activity); Ruth Slaton Fowler Estate Trust, SEC No-Action
Letter (Dec. 10, 1975) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (publisher of a stock market cal-
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personal investment advice to individual clients.31
The Act's definition of an investment adviser excludes "the publisher
of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine, or business or financial pub-
lication of general and regular circulation."32 Consequently, these pub-
lishers are insulated from the SEC's regulatory powers. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit addressed the imprecise scope of the "bona
fide publications" exclusion in SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.33 In
that case, the court held that the first amendment was not violated
merely by the enforcement of a subpoena which required the publishers
of a bi-weekly securities tabloid to disclose certain commercial informa-
tion.3 4 The court determined that the "bona fide publications" exclusion
encompassed only "those publications which do not deviate from custom-
ary newspaper activities to such an extent that there is a likelihood that
the wrongdoing which the Act was designed to prevent has occurred." 5
endar containing Dow Jones Industrial Average and Price Earnings Ratio is an investment
adviser); Municipal Advisory Council of Texas, SEC No-Action Letter, [1975-1976 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,410, at 86,086 (Nov. 20, 1975) (statistical reporting ser-
vice concerning municipal securities is an investment advisory activity).
Newsletters focusing on the general economy or the financial environment may result in a
publisher being classified by the SEC as an investment adviser. See, e.g., Sorg Printing Co.,
SEC No-Action Letter (Jan. 20, 1979) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); John Exter, SEC
No-Action Letter (May 12, 1976) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); Clifford L. Temes,
SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. 13, 1976) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). For a discussion
of the SEC's interpretation, see generally Harroch, supra note 15, at 69-70, 73-80.
31. See SECURTIES AND EXCHANGE CoMMIssIoN, REPORT ON SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES
MARKET, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 146 (1963) [hereinafter Special
Study]; see, e.g., PM, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 77,839, at 79,225 (Oct. 4, 1984) (SEC informed the publisher that it would look
to the content, advertising and readership to determine if a health industry newsletter was a
report concerning securities for Investment Act definitional purposes); Frost & Sullivan,
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,142 (July 5,
1978) (SEC informed a marketing-research firm selling investment research reports which
were prepared by investment-banking firms and brokerage firms, that the marketing-re-
search firm would have to register as an investment adviser); G. Tsai & Co., SEC Ruling,
[1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,686 (May 16, 1978) (SEC informed pub-
lisher of construction industry report that, if report was aimed primarily at investors who
are customers of a broker-dealer, the publisher would be deemed an investment adviser.
SEC examines material contained in the newsletters, the manner in which it is promoted,
and the report's audience); Media General Financial Daily [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,961 (Aug. 16, 1971) (involved proposed daily general business news-
paper similar to the Wall Street Journal; SEC refused to give a no-action letter, because it
had neither a general nor regular circulation and its purpose was to assist subscribers in
making investment decisions). But see FINANCE MAGAZINE [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,536 (Oct. 6, 1971) (SEC came to opposite conclusion with a different
magazine).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-2(a)(11)(D).
33. 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
34. Id. at 1381.
35. Id. at 1377 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 21:205
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Furthermore, the court stated "whether or not a given publication fits
within this exclusion must depend upon the nature of its practice rather
than upon the purely formal 'indicia of a newspaper' which it exhibits on
its face and in the size and nature of its subscription list."3 Conse-
quently, the SEC was empowered to continue investigation of the defend-
ants' commercial operations. The investigation concluded upon the SEC's
commencement of an action for an injunction compelling defendants'
SEC registration and halting publication of the tabloid. Upon review, the
district court refused to grant the injunction, finding instead that the Act
excluded the Transcript as a "bona fide publication. 3 7 Although the
Transcript may have been engaged in investment advice distribution, it
was not an "investment adviser" since the published material came en-
tirely from reprinted brokerage house reports, and the Transcript re-
ceived no compensation for publication from these brokerage houses.38
Alternatively, in SEC v. Wall Street Publishing Institute, Inc., 9 the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the
publisher of Stockmarket Magazine was not excluded from the Act.40
The magazine received compensation from subscribers, gave advice con-
cerning the value of securities or the desirability of purchasing or selling
specific securities, and issued reports and analyses. 41
B. History of First Amendment Issues Presented in Lowe
Three first amendment issues were presented in Lowe. First, whether
the SEC's action pursuant to the Act was a permissible regulation of a
profession, even though such action might incidentally curtail certain
types of speech. Second, whether an injunction against further publica-
tion of Lowe's newsletters was an unconstitutional prior restraint upon
36. Id. (footnote omitted). Most of the Wall Street Transcript's published materials con-
sisted of reprinted reports assessing specific securities. "This ... at least raises doubt about
whether the [publication] is outside the exclusion ...... Id. at 1377-78. Thus, the SEC was
allowed to investigate the Transcript's commercial practices without violating the first
amendment. Id. at 1380. After the investigation, the SEC sought an injunction against the
Transcript for operating as an unregistered investment adviser. SEC v. Wall St. Transcript
Corp., 454 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
37. Id. at 565-67.
38. Id. The SEC has reinforced the views expressed in the Wall Street Transcript. It has
followed a long standing policy of interpreting the "bona fide publications" exclusion as
excluding an investment newsletter from regulation only if, based on "content, advertising
material, readership, and the relevant factors, a [newsletter] is not primarily a vehicle for
distributing investment advice." Applicability of Investment Advisers Act to Certain Publi-
cations, 42 Fed. Reg. 2953 n.1 (1977) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 276 (1984)).
39. 591 F. Supp. 1070 (D.D.C. 1984).
40. Id. at 1072.
41. Id. at 1077-78. Lowe's newsletters are quite similar in content to the Stockmarket
Magazine in the Wall Street Publishing case. Part III of this article will examine whether
Lowe's publishing activities fall within the "bona fide publications" exclusion.
1986]
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fully protected speech. Finally, whether Lowe's newsletters were within
the scope of the commercial speech doctrine and, if so, whether the SEC's
regulations could survive the reduced level of scrutiny used to analyze
commercial speech restrictions.
1. Regulation of a Profession and the First Amendment
State regulation of a profession which incidentally curtails freedom of
speech is permissible.42 States typically regulate professionals through the
use of licensing schemes and disbarment procedures.43 For example, in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,44 the United States Supreme
Court denied relief to a lawyer disbarred because of illegal solicitation of
clients. While the attorney's right to solicit clients merited some first
amendment protection, the Court nevertheless concluded that "the State
does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to
the public whenever speech is a component of that activity. '45
This decision establishes that where a fiduciary relationship exists be-
tween a professional and his client, the state has a compelling interest in
protecting the client from fraud. This interest can be upheld by the regu-
lation of commercial transactions within the profession and by the insti-
tution of rules and regulations which promote high standards of profes-
sional behavior.46 However, "the principle that the government may
restrict entry into professions and vocations through licensing schemes
has never been extended to encompass the licensing of speech per se
... .At some point, a measure is no longer a regulation of a profession
but a regulation of speech" which as a prior restraint must survive a
heightened level of judicial scrutiny.47
42. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
43. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1910) (doctors); Dent v. West Virginia, 129
U.S. 114, 121-23 (1889) (doctors).
44. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
45. Id. at 456; see also Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1967)
(regulations on entry into a profession are constitutional if rationally related to applicants'
fitness to practice profession). But see Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
(truthful advertising by lawyer of "routine" legal services is protected by the first amend-
ment). See generally Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the First Amendment, 1981 AM. B.
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 967.
46. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460, 465-67.
47. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 229-30 (1985) (citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for
a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980)); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Jami-
son v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Near v. Minnesota
ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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2. Prior Restraints
This raises the second significant first amendment issue in Lowe: would
an injunction against further publication of Lowe's newsletters be an un-
constitutional prior restraint?48 In New York Times Co. v. United
States,49 the Supreme Court recognized the general rule that a complete
prohibition or prior restraint of fully protected speech is presumptively
unconstitutional and may be sustained "only in exceptional cases such as
when there is a threat of grave and immediate danger to the security of
the United States. '50
3. Commercial Speech
The most significant first amendment issue involved is whether Lowe's
newsletters fall within the scope of the commercial speech doctrine.5 1 If
the newsletters are commercial speech, the SEC's prohibition of further
publication will be reviewed under a lesser degree of first amendment
scrutiny.52
Recently the Court has given first amendment protection to speech
48. A "prior restraint" is a suppression of the right to publish, as opposed to a punish-
ment imposed after publication. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556-
62 (1976); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418-19 (1971); Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S.
697, 714 (1931). See generally BARRON & DmIEs, supra note 1, at 33-61; Emerson, The
Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CoNrEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955); Redish, The Proper
Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REv. 53 (1984);
Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983).
49. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
50. Id. at 740 (held that government could not restrain publication of the Pentagon Pa-
pers; threat to national security insufficient to uphold injunction).
51. The first case to extend commercial speech first amendment protection was Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (held government could not prohibit dissemination of abortion
advertisement). Prior to Bigelow, purely commercial advertising received no first amend-
ment protection. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upheld ordinance
prohibiting distribution of advertisements in the streets).
In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976), the Court explicitly stated that the first amendment protected commercial
speech. The Court invalidated a Virginia statute that prohibited pharmacists from publish-
ing prescription drug prices. Id. at 761-73. The Court stated that society's interest in the
free flow of commercial information must be protected to ensure intelligent and informed
decisions. Id. at 762-65. See generally BARRON & DmNss, supra note 1, at 155-88; NowAK,
ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 1, at 767-79; Redish, The First Amendment in the Market-
place: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429
(1971); Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1080; Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLuM. L. REv. 720
(1982); Note, The Federal Securities Laws, The First Amendment, and Commercial
Speech: A Call for Consistency, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 57 (1984) [hereinafter Note, The
Federal Securities Laws].
52. See infra text accompanying note 58.
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which "does no more than 'propose a purely commercial transaction.' ,53
Thus far, the Court only has extended the doctrine to give expressions in
advertisements first amendment protection. 54 The Court stated its ration-
ale for extending this protection to advertisements in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,5  hold-
ing that in a free market economy "the free flow of commercial informa-
tion" to consumers should not be restricted.56 Accordingly, a Virginia
statute prohibiting pharmacists from publishing prescription drug prices
was invalidated.
The test for determining the constitutionality of a regulation which re-
stricts commercial speech was formulated by the Court in Central Hud-
son & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.57 The
four-part test states that:
For commercial speech to come within [first amendment protection], it at
least must concern lawful activity and must not be misleading. Next we
must ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.5
Thus, if Lowe's newsletters constitute commercial speech, then the Cen-
tral Hudson four-part test will determine whether the SEC's prohibition
53. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820-21 (1975); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73-75 (1983) (striking down federal law prohibiting mailing of
unsolicited contraceptive advertisements) upon the grounds that society's interest in free
flow of truthful commercial information outweighs state's interest in regulating offensive
advertisements). For a discussion of the case, see Note, Constitutional Law-First Amend-
ment-Protection of Commercial Speech-Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 32 U. KAN.
L. REv. 679 (1984); see also Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (advertisements of drug
prices); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973) (held constitutional a city ordinhnce designed to forbid newspapers from carrying
sex-designated advertising for nonexempt job opportunities).
54. See, e.g., Bolger, 463 U.S. at 60 (advertisements of contraceptives); Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (advertisements by utility
company for use of electricity); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (optometrist advertis-
ing through use of trade names); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S.
85 (1977) (sign posting by real estate agencies); Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (advertis-
ing by pharmacists). In Ad World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136, 1140 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982), the court stated that "[tihe Supreme Court has
confined. . . 'commercial speech' to cases involving 'purely commercial advertising'" (citing
Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 384).
55. 425 U.S. 748.
56. Id. at 762-65.
57. 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (held unconstitutional a state public service commission's regula-
tion banning advertisements promoting use of electricity). The Court found that despite the
state's substantial interest in energy conservation, a blanket prohibition on advertising was
too drastic to survive commercial speech scrutiny. Id. at 568-71. See generally Note, Time,
Place or Manner Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 127 (1983).
58. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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on future publication is constitutional under the first amendment. How-
ever, as suggested later in this comment, courts should not necessarily
conclude that all advisory publications concerning securities are commer-
cial speech.59
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION: Lowe v. SEC
A. Statement of the Case
Christopher Lowe was the president and principal shareholder of the
Lowe Management Corporation which was registered as an investment
adviser pursuant to the Act.0 From 1974 to 1981, Lowe was convicted of
several theft-related crimes.6 1 In 1979, the SEC instituted an administra-
tive action against Lowe and the Lowe Management Corporation, alleging
that Lowe had violated the Act's antifraud provisions since he failed to
disclose these convictions.62 The proceedings resulted in the revocation of
the corporation's registration, effectively barring Lowe from associating
with any investment advisers.68
Thereafter, Lowe stopped giving clients personal advice, but continued
publication of two investment newsletters, the Lowe Investment and Fi-
nancial Letter and the Lowe Stock Advisory." These newsletters as-
sessed general market trends, reviewed investment strategies, and recom-
59. See infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
60. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 183 (1985).
61. Id. (footnote omitted). These convictions included misappropriating an investment
client's funds, engaging in business as an unregistered investment adviser, tampering with
evidence to cover up fraud of an investment client, and stealing from a bank. Id.
62. Id.
63. See In re Lowe Management Corp., [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,873, at 84,321 (May 11, 1981). The SEC has power to revoke the registration of an invest-
ment adviser who commits a crime. 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-3(e)(2)(c) (1982); see supra note 22.
64. Lowe published the Lowe Investment and Financial Letter and the Lowe Stock Advi-
sory. A third publication, the Lowe Stock Chart Service, had solicited subscriptions but was
never published. SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 895 (2d Cir. 1984). A typical issue of the Lowe
Letter contained general comments on the securities and bullion markets, offered advice on
desirability of various investments, including stocks, treasury bills, and money market
funds. It recommended the purchase or sale of specific securities. The number of subscribers
varied from 3,000 to 19,000. Subscriptions cost $39 for one year or $79 for three years. Lowe
offered a special telephone hotline for investors to call for updated recommendations. Id. at
895.
The Lowe Stock Advisory had only a few hundred subscribers. Subscriptions cost the
same as the Lowe Letter. However, the advice was much more specific, with particular em-
phasis on the purchase, sale or hold recommendations on lower-priced stocks. Id.
At trial, subscribers criticized the publication's lack of regularity. The Lowe Letter was
advertised as semi-monthly, but only eight issues came out after entry of the 1981 order
prohibiting Lowe from associating as an investment adviser. See infra note 63. However,
there was no evidence that any material Lowe published was misleading or fraudulent. See
Lowe, 472 U.S. at 185-86.
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mended buying and selling of specific securities.65
In 1982, the SEC sued Lowe and his corporation to enjoin further
newsletter publication, alleging that he was acting as an unregistered in-
vestment adviser in violation of section 80(b)-3(a) of the Act.6 The dis-
trict court denied the SEC's injunction request, concluding that it would
amount to an unconstitutional prior restraint on Lowe's right to publish
and disseminate impersonal investment advice to the general public.67
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that the publishers were not investment advisers. Therefore, the
court reasoned that no first amendment rights were violated by revoca-
tion of Lowe's registration or the prohibition on the publication of the
newsletters."'
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in October 1984,
to consider these important issues concerning securities regulation under
the Act and the first amendment guarantees of free speech and press.69
65. Id. at 185.
66. SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
67. Id. at 1365. Although the court did not hold the Act unconstitutional, it did distin-
guish impersonal advice offered through publications and personal advice, finding that an
injunction could be issued only against the latter. Id. at 1369. The district court's decision
may have been the first to accept the argument that SEC injunctions may violate the free
speech guarantee. See Note, The Federal Securities Laws, supra note 51, at 68 n.61.
68. SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1984). The court rejected Lowe's constitutional
claims, finding instead that the SEC acted pursuant to a legitimate power to regulate a
professional commercial activity when it denied Lowe's registration application. Id. at 901.
The court characterized the newsletters as "potentially deceptive commercial speech" sub-
ject to legitimate regulation under the Act. Id. Finally, the court noted that Lowe only was
prevented from selling personal advice concerning the value of specific securities or the ad-
visability of their purchase or sale, not from publishing a newspaper of general interest, "or
from publishing recommendations in someone else's bona fide newspaper as an employer,
editor, or writer." Id. at 902. The dissent agreed with the district court, ruling that the
newsletters were outside the rubric of commercial speech, and therefore were entitled to full
first amendment protection. Id. at 906. (Brieant, J., dissenting). For a discussion of permis-
sible regulation of a profession under the first amendment, see supra note 45; for a discus-
sion on commercial speech, see supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text; for a discussion of
prior restraints on fully protected speech, see supra note 48.
Following its appellate victory in Lowe, the SEC instituted actions against several invest-
ment newsletter publishers. See, e.g., SEC v. Suter, 732 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1984) (held the
first amendment was no defense to an action for an injunction prohibiting publication of
newsletters); In re Weinberg, SEC Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 918 (July
31, 1984) (Lexis, Fedsec library, Cases file) (SEC prohibited an unregistered adviser who
published a newsletter from associating as an investment adviser); see supra notes 39-41
and accompanying text for a discussion of Wall Street Publishing.
69. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 188-89.
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B. The Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
In reversing the Second Circuit decision, a majority of the Court
avoided the first amendment issues presented by Lowe.70 Rather, the
Court found the Act excluded Lowe's newsletters under the "bona fide
publications" exception.7 ' The Court reasoned that because the newslet-
ters' contents were entirely disinterested and were offered to the public
on a regular basis, they fell within the plain language of the exclusion.
7 2
Consequently, Lowe was not an investment adviser and therefore was not
subject to the SEC's regulations or sanctions.7 3 The majority concluded
that Congress intended to regulate only those advisers offering clients
personal advice.7 4 By crediting Congress with awareness of the first
amendment issues involved when the Act was enacted, the majority in-
ferred that Congress could not have intended to regulate speech through
licensing of nonpersonalized investment advice contained in newsletters.7 5
70. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985). The Court adhered to the principal of "consti-
tutional avoidance," which states that:
A statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion
that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score . . . [but if] the
intention of the Congress is revealed too clearly, [you cannot ignore] it because of
mere misgivings as to power. . . .The problem must be faced and answered.
George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933) (emphasis added); see also
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
71. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 211. The court stated "[t]he Act was designed to apply to those
persons. . . who provide personalized advice attuned to a client's concerns ... .The mere
fact that a publication [gives] advice . . . about specific securities does not give it the per-
sonalized character [of an investment adviser]." Id. at 207-08. But see SEC v. Myers, 285 F.
Supp. 743 (D.C. Md. 1968) (held publisher of newsletter was investment adviser where pub-
lication gave advice on specific securities and offered reports on securities business); Har-
roch, supra note 15, at 76 (clearest example of when the SEC staff would classify publica-
tion as giving investment advice is upon the recommendations of particular securities).
72. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 206. The Court concluded a publication would be "bonafide" if it
contained disinterested information and was offered to the general public on a regular
schedule. Id. The Court's conclusion that Lowe's newsletters were regular publications may
be erroneous. See id. at 185 (testimony at trial indicated not regular).
73. Id. at 210-11. The majority held that "[a]s long as [Lowe's] communications [to]...
subscribers remain entirely impersonal and do not develop into the kind of fiduciary, per-
son-to-person relationships that were [described by] the legislative history of the Act...
the publications [will be] . . . presumptively, within the exclusion." Id. at 210.
74. Id. at 204; see supra note 71.
75. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 204. Justice White criticized the majority's conclusion, stating that
Congress should not be credited with "the ability to predict [the Court's] constitutional
holdings 45 years in advance of [the Court's] declining to reach them." Id. at 227. However,
the majority stated that Congress must have been aware of the holding in Near v. Minne-
sota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (established right of liberty of speech and press to be
free of prior restraints), and Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (struck down
ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature). Lowe, 472 U.S. at 204-05. The Court con-
cluded the mention of Lovell in the legislative history "supports a broad reading of the
19861
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2. Concurring Opinion
Justice White vigorously disagreed with the majority's "improvident
construction" of the statute in his concurring opinion.76 He found that
Lowe was clearly "an investment adviser subject to regulation and sanc-
tion under the Act."'7 7 However, he concurred with the majority's result
because he felt that "to prevent [Lowe] from publishing at all" would
violate the first amendment.
7 8
Further, he agreed "that constitutional adjudication should be avoided
where it is fairly possible to do so without negating the intent of Con-
gress."' 79 Nevertheless, he found that to exclude "publishers of investment
advisory newsletters from the definition of 'investment adviser' [would]
not only [run] counter to the [Act's] language, 0 legislative history,81 and
administrative construction, '8 2 but also would prevent legitimate statu-
tory application of the statute to publishers of investment advisory news-
letters to protect the public against potentially serious types of fraud.83
Unlike the majority, Justice White addressed whether the first amend-
ment permits the federal government to prohibit Lowe's publication of
investment advice newsletters circulated to the general public.84 He re-
jected the government's argument that the SEC's use of a registration
scheme is permissible regulation of entry into a profession 5 and instead
exclusion for publishers." Id. at 205.
76. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985).
77. Id. Justice White found that Lowe undeniably engaged in the business of giving ad-
vice as to the desirability of purchasing or selling specific securities. Id. at 214; see infra
notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
78. Id. at 211.
79. Id. at 212; see, e.g., United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 31 (1980) (construction of
statute fair and reasonable in light of language, purpose, history of enactment); Yu Cong
Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 518 (1926) ("amendment may not be substituted for con-
struction, and ... a court may not exercise legislative [role] to save the law [from conflict
with the Constitution]"); see also supra note 70.
80. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 224. Effect should be given to all statutory language; since the defi-
nition of an investment adviser specifically includes those who give investment advice
"through publications" and who "issue ... analyses or reports concerning securities,"
Lowe's activities are covered. Id. See generally Harroch, supra note 15, at 80.
81. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 224; see S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 43, reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEws 4897, 4939 (stating the Act regulates "those who receive
compensation for advising others [about securities] or who are in the business of issuing
... reports concerning securities") (emphasis added); see also Special Study, supra note
31, at 146 (publishers of periodic market reports are investment advisers).
82. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 224. For a discussion on the SEC's interpretation of the applicabil-
ity of the Act to investment newsletters, see supra note 31. See generally Lovitch, supra
note 15, at 79-104.
83. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 224; see infra note 109 and accompanying text.
84. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 228.
85. For a discussion on permissible regulation of entry into a profession, see supra notes
42-47 and accompanying text.
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reasoned that the Act's provisions preventing unregistered persons from
giving advice have more than a merely incidental effect on speech.86 He
found that such provisions impermissibly restrict speech per se and there-
fore are direct restraints on the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and press.8 7 Consequently, these regulations would be subject to strict
scrutiny under the first amendment.""
Justice White did not decide whether the newsletters contained fully
protected speech or commercial speech. Regardless of classification, he
was firmly persuaded that the SEC's "flat prohibition or prior restraint
on [legitimate as well as fraudulent advice], as applied to fully protected
speech, [was] presumptively invalid and [could] be sustained only under
the most extraordinary circumstances."8' 9 The government did not
demonstrate any extraordinary circumstances warranting a decision to
uphold the ban. 0 Alternatively, the SEC's restrictions on Lowe's right to
publish could not survive even if scrutinized under commercial speech
standards, since the restrictions were more extensive than necessary to
meet the government's interest in protecting investors from unscrupulous
advisers. 91 Justice White also found that Lowe's past misconduct could
86. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 228-33. Justice White reasoned:
Where the personal nexus between professional and client does not exist, and a
speaker does not purport to be exercising judgment on behalf of [his client] ... gov-
ernment regulation ceases to function as a legitimate regulation of professional prac-
tice with only incidental impact on speech; it becomes regulation of speaking or pub-
lishing as such, subject to the First Amendment's command that 'Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.'
Id. at 232 (emphasis added); see also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). But
see Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (holding municipality validly can forbid individ-
uals from passing leaflets out in the middle of the street).
87. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 233 (the Act prevented unregistered persons from publishing infor-
mation for the public; it did not merely regulate entry in to the profession).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 234. For a discussion on the resolution of whether the newsletters should be
classified as commercial speech, see infra text accompanying notes 113-22. See generally
Note, The Federal Securities Laws, supra note 51.
90. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 234 (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (finding a prior restraint invalid even where publication of Pentagon Papers would
endanger national security)); see also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Near v. Min-
nesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
91. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 235. Justice White stated, "It cannot be plausibly maintained that
investment advice from a person whose background indicates that he is unreliable is inher-
ently misleading or deceptive, nor am I convinced that less drastic remedies than outright
suppression.., are not available to achieve the government's... purpose." Id. But see
SEC v. Suter, 732 F.2d 1294, 1299 (7th Cir. 1984) (court held false and misleading invest-
ment newsletters were commercial speech; newsletters were unprotected under the test es-
tablished in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)
(because they were misleading); Savage v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 548 F.2d
192, 196 (7th Cir. 1977) (Commodity Exchange Bulletin treated as commercial speech). The
Suter injunction was no broader than necessary because the publisher's deceptive newslet-
ters had to be stopped to protect investors. Suter, 732 F.2d at 1299. However, in Lowe the
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not restrict him from publishing in the future.92 He supported this con-
tention with the Court's "commercial speech cases [which] have consist-
ently rejected the [idea] that. . . drastic prohibitions on speech, [such as
flat-out bans], may be justified by a mere possibility that [future] speech
will be fraudulent."
93
Finally, Justice White emphasized the narrow scope of his decision, to
"hold only that the Act may not constitutionally be applied to prevent
[unregistered] persons . . . (including [those] whose registration [was] de-
nied . . . revoked [or suspended]) from offering impersonal investment
advice through publications" such as Lowe's newsletters.
III. ANALYSIS OF Lowe DECISION: IMPROPER CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE
A. Applicability of Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to Investment
Newsletters
Justice White's definition of an investment adviser is preferable to the
majority's definition. His view is supported by the SEC's administrative
interpretation of the Act, the Act's plain language, legislative history and
purpose. Arguably, the majority overextended the constitutional avoid-
ance doctrine95 when they interpreted the Act to exclude Lowe from the
definition of an investment adviser.
1. SEC Administrative Interpretation of the Act
The SEC's consistent application of the Act to publishers of investment
newsletters, such as the type published by Lowe, supports the conclusion
that Lowe is an investment adviser under the Act.9 6 The SEC routinely
has interpreted "investment adviser" to include parties whose activities
are limited to publication of investment advisory newsletters.97 The
"bona fide publications" exclusion has been construed to exclude a news-
letter publisher from federal regulation under the Act "only where, based
on the content, advertising material, [and] readership,. . . [the] publica-
newsletters were not misleading, and thus a complete ban would be too restrictive to be
upheld under Central Hudson.
92. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 235.
93. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626
(1985)); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977). In Zauderer, a lawyer's advertisements containing statements regarding the legal
rights of persons injured by the Dalkon Shield constituted commercial speech. Zauderer,
471 U.S. at 638.
94. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 236.
95. See supra note 70.
96. See supra note 37. See generally Harroch, supra note 15, at 73-80. An agency's con-
struction of a statute should be given substantial weight. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
97. See supra notes 30, 37.
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tion is not primarily a vehicle for distributing investment advice [to indi-
viduals]." ' 8 Generally, the courts have followed this rationale.9
Lowe's investment newsletters not only contained general comments
about the securities and bullion markets but also made specific recom-
mendations for purchasing, selling or holding stocks. 100 Additionally, the
newsletter offered subscribers a telephone hotline to obtain current finan-
cial information. 10 1 Although Lowe did not offer investment advice "spe-
cifically tailored to [his individual subscribers'] needs,. . . he undeniably
engaged 'in the business of advising others. . . through publications...
as to the value of securities' and he issued. . . analyses or reports con-
cerning securities."'01 2 Therefore, the court should have found Lowe
within the definition of an "investment adviser" under section 80(b)-
2(11)(D) of the Act.
2. Plain Language of the Act
The majority's broad interpretation of "investment adviser" disregards
language in the Act specifying that an "investment adviser" includes one
who gives investment advice through publications or who issues reports
on securities.10 3 If Congress had intended for all bona fide publications to
be excluded from regulation under the Act, it would be difficult to imag-
ine why this language including publishers would have been written into
the definition of an investment adviser at all.1°0
3. Legislative History of the Act
In the legislative history, representatives of the SEC and investment
advisers sought application of the Act to investment newsletter publish-
ers. 10 5 The Senate Report did not emphatically state that a personal rela-
tionship between an adviser and a client would be a necessary prerequi-
98. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 216 (1985).
99. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
100. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 185.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 214.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1982). The definition specifically states that individuals
rendering investment advice through publications are within the Act's definition. Cases have
interpreted this to include publishers of investment newsletters. See, e.g., SEC v. Suter, 732
F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1984).
104. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 218 (1985) (White, J., concurring). Justice White pointed
out that "if the [bona fide publications] exception is expanded to [encompass] more than
just publications that are not primarily vehicles for distributing investment advice, it [would
be] difficult to imagine any workable definition that does not sweep in all publications that
are not personally tailored to individual clients." Id. at 216. However, the court adopted this
type of expansive definition. Id. at 217 n.3.
105. See supra note 29. See generally Butowsky, Counselling the Investment Adviser,
1975 PRACTSING L. INST. 19-27.
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site for classification as an investment adviser under the Act. 06 The Act's
definition of an investment adviser includes those who give advice
through publications.1 0 7 This expressly discounts the majority's assertion
that Congress intended the Act to apply only to those advisers who give
personal investment advice. 08
4. Purpose of the Act
The purpose of the Act is to prevent fraud. Thus, a publication such as
Lowe's, which is primarily a vehicle for offering investment advice, is
clearly a target for regulation. A newsletter which recommends specific
securities and investments can be abused to perpetrate fraud on individu-
als more so than a general publication which does not recommend specific
securities. Accordingly, the majority's exclusion of Lowe from regulation
under the Act will impede prevention of fraudulent acts by newsletter
publishers. 109 Lowe's newsletters do not entail "customary newspaper ac-
tivities." 11° Rather, their content and readership deal with the very activi-
ties the Act was designed to regulate, such as recommending the buying
and selling of specific securities.
B. Determining the Proper Level of First Amendment Protection for
Investment Newsletters
The SEC's injunction against further publication of Lowe's newsletters
is not a legitimate regulation of a profession. The theory of professional
licensing should not be expanded to regulate the press,, Lowe's criminal
conviction indeed may be condemnable; however, past impropriety has
not been a legitimate reason for denial of a license that results in free
speech curtailment." 2
Furthermore, the Court has not expanded the commercial speech doc-
trine to include this communication medium. Although the Court has not
clearly defined commercial speech, it appears limited to advertisements
106. See S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 22 (1940).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-2(a)(11) (1982).
108. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 221 n.7 (1985).
109. Id. at 225 n.8 (1985). If the "bona fide publications" exclusion is broadly construed,
the publishers of investment newsletters will be beyond the reach of tools used by SEC to
uncover and prevent fraudulent activities, such as "scalping." For a definition of scalping,
see supra note 24.
110. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
111. See L. TRIuE, AMEmCAN CONsTrrUmIoNA LAW § 12-31, at 724 (1978) (discussing his-
torical opposition to press licensing systems).
112. Courts have held past misconduct is not a basis for denial or revocation of license.
See Cornflower Entertainment, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 485 F. Supp. 777, 785 (D. Utah
1980) (citing 23 additional cases).
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that "propose a commercial transaction.""1 Lowe's newsletters, however,
are not advertisements and they do not propose a commercial transac-
tion. Rather, they "contain fact and opinion not about Lowe's own ser-
vices, or products, but about services and products sold by others.11 4 Ac-
cordingly, since Lowe had no economic interest in the material he
reported on, his newsletters should not have been defined as commercial
speech.
While the Court may have intended to encompass more than just ad-
vertisements within the commercial speech doctrine, it certainly did not
desire to extend the doctrine into an area of private economic decision-
making. 1 5 This is especially true since the free flow of information in this
area is of great importance to investors. "At the very least, it is suggested
'commercial speech' should not include opinions about transactions to
which a speaker is not a potential party."11 Even if Lowe's newletters
were characterized as commercial speech, an injunction against Lowe
would fail the four-part Central Hudson test used by the Court to deter-
mine the constitutionality of restrictions on commercial speech.
117
Lowe's newsletters merit first amendment protection pursuant to the
first prong of the test because they contain authorized (lawful) material
and are not misleading.118 "Next we must ask whether the asserted gov-
ernment interest is substantial . ". .. ""'I The government clearly has a
legitimate interest in regulating investment advisers to prevent unscrupu-
lous advisers from perpetrating frauds upon investors. The court then
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the govern-
ment's interest. Finally, the regulation must not be more extensive than
113. See supra notes 51-57. For an excellent law review article on the definition of com-
mercial speech, see Comment, Commercial Speech: A Proposed Definition, 27 How. L.J.
1015 (1984).
114. Comment, supra note 2, at 952 (emphasis added).
115. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24
(1976). The Court suggested that commercial speech may be verified more easily by its dis-
seminator than, for example, news reporting or political commentary because the advertiser
ordinarily disseminates a product or service that he provides and presumably knows more
about than anyone else. Id. The Court also said that "[c]ommercial speech may be more
durable than other kinds, and since advertising is the sine qua non of... profits, there is
little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation." Id. Conversely, it would appear
that the great amount of opinion in investment newsletters would make them less verifiable
by the publisher and more likely to be "chilled" by regulation.
116. Note, The Federal Securities Laws, supra note 51, at 75.
117. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. A flat-out ban on publication would be
too drastic. Lowe had not actually published fraudulent newsletters. There was merely a
risk he might do so in the future. For cases holding that drastic prohibition on speech may
not be justified by a mere possibility the speech will be fraudulent, see In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191, 203 (1982), and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
118. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1985).
119. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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necessary to serve that interest.12 0 In Lowe, the SEC injunction totally
bars Lowe from publishing his newsletters. This form of regulation is
more extensive than necessary to accomplish the government's interest.
For example, the SEC could use the Act's antifraud provisions to punish
a fraudulent act after it has occurred.2 ' Accordingly, regulations impos-
ing a complete ban on the publication of legitimate newsletters, such as
Lowe's, cannot survive even the reduced level of first amendment scrutiny
applied to review restrictions on commercial speech.
122
Lowe's newsletters should be entitled to full protection under the first
amendment. Therefore, an injunction against further publication of the
newsletters clearly places a prior restraint on Lowe's right to disseminate
truthful information and commentary.1 2 An injunction which prohibits
all communication, lawful as well as unlawful, is an impermissible prior
restraint tolerable only under the most severe conditions. 24 If Lowe pub-
lishes fraudulent information, the SEC should be entitled to sanction
him. However, the first amendment theory of prior restraints does not
allow the SEC to prevent him from offering truthful investment advice to
the public in advance of its dissemination. 1 5
IV. CONCLUSION
Lowe v. SEC is important for the future of federal regulation under the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as well as for determining the proper
first amendment protection afforded investment newsletters. Unfortu-
nately, the majority's broad interpretation of the statute, which excludes
publishers of investment newsletters such as Lowe from regulation, signif-
icantly lessens the SEC's power to monitor and prevent fraudulent acts
by such publishers. However, in the final analysis, the Court's result will
benefit publishers of newsletters, as well as the investing public. Since
120. Id.
121. See SEC v. Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mich. 1983), aff'd, 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir.
1985) (mail fraud statute of Act successfully used by SEC against newsletter publisher).
Justice White suggested that Blavin would not be applicable to Lowe's situation because to
apply the mail fraud statute in order to require disclosure, a fiduciary duty must exist be-
tween the publisher and his client. Consequently, the majority's ruling excluding publishers
such as Lowe from the purview of the Act deletes the necessary fiduciary requirement.
Lowe, 472 U.S. at 225 n.8.
122. See supra text accompanying note 58.
123. The Supreme Court has warned that it "strikes at the very heart" of the first amend-
ment to require a license from the government as a condition of exercising freedom of
speech or press. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939). The Court held: "To
require a censorship through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered dis-
tribution of pamphlets strikes at the very heart of constitutional guarantees." Id. Thus,
freedom of speech cannot be conditioned upon obtaining a license, even if the government
claims it has an interest in preventing fraud. See id.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
125. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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Lowe was not required to register as an investment adviser, the Court
effectively prevented the SEC from supressing Lowe's right to dissemi-
nate valuable information to the public. Thus, it upheld the first amend-
ment right to free speech without actually addressing the issue.
This comment has suggested that publishers of investment newsletters
should be considered investment advisers under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940. This construction would be consistent with the administra-
tive interpretation of the Act by the SEC, the Act's plain language, its
legislative history, and its purpose. This comment also has suggested that
investment newsletters contain fully protected speech immune from prior
restraint. The SEC should heed the warning contained in Lowe, and limit
encroachment on the fundamental rights of free speech and press. Courts
may rely on Justice White's concurring opinion in Lowe to strike down
federal securities regulations which impose impermissible restrictions on
free speech.
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126. Justice White's guidelines also may be used to analyze first amendment implications
of restrictions in speech in other areas of governmental regulation. For example, in Joslin v.
Secretary of Dept. of Treasury, 616 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Utah 1985), the district court adopted
the first amendment guidelines established by Justice White in Lowe. Id. at 1026-27. These
guidelines were used to determine the line between legitimate regulation of a profession and
impermissible prohibitions on speech. Id.
In Joslin, an attorney brought an action challenging the constitutionality of IRS regula-
tions which governed standards of practice of attorneys and others who gave opinions on tax
shelter offerings. The district court held that the IRS regulations were permissible regula-
tions of the legal profession. Id. The court utilized Justice White's guidelines and found "a
personal nexus exist[ed] between the attorney and the client when his professional judg-
ment [was] sought." Id. at 1027. Thus, because there was a fiduciary relationship involved
the state could permissibly regulate the profession in order to protect clients from fraud.
Although this case does not deal with federal securities regulations, it does indicate that
courts may look to the guidelines established by Justice White in Lowe to determine if
government regulations impermissibly restrict free speech.
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